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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
S'C;::·E OF UTk.H, 
Plalntiff-Respondent, 
-"-.?S- Case No. 16422 
?~::.:;;:JOLPH CRJ..IG, 
De:endant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPO~<DE:1T 
S'='.::.'Cn:E'IT Or THE :~ATU?E OF THE CASE 
~~pella~t ~as charged ~ith aggravated robbery, in 
\·~::..a'::~o:-. c: l"tah co::e ;..:u• .. § /E-6-302 (1953), as amended. 
;:JISPOSI':'IO:' E THE LOh'ER COl'RT 
A::ella~t ~as tried be:ore a jury and found guilty 
c: c~e count of aggravated robbery on September 20 and 21, 
:9-8, ~n the 7~ird Jud1cial Court, 1n and for Salt Lake 
C::;..;.:--.::·:, S::a:e c= C::ar., '":he Honorable Jay E. Banks, presiding. 
C:::::o;_::~:- :r, ~c;.-c., a~~,ellc..nt conroitted to the custody 
t~E J:v_s!cn a: Correc'::10ns :or a ninety day evaluation 
=~!-s.Jc.:-.: ':.C t·:c.:-.. co::e .'-.nr .. § 16-3-~0~ (1953), as amended. On 
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of the Division of Corrections for another such ninety day 
evaluation. On April 3, 1979, appellant was sentenced to 
the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of not 
less than five years to life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEF~ 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and 
judgment of the lmver court. 
STF.TEME!lT OF THE FACTS 
At about 2:50 a.m. on July 6, 1978, ~obert Skelto~. 
assistant manager of the 7-11 store at ~inth South and F1~th 
East in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah was robbed at 
gunpoint of approx1mately one hundred and fifty dollars by 
two ~lack men (Tr. 82, 83). The men told Mr. Skelton to g:ve 
them the money from the t1ll. Mr. Skelton ~ut curr~~cy ~rc~ 
the till into a paper sack. One of the assa:lants rtacted 
lnto the till and put what co1ns he could reach ~ro~ the 
till into the paper bag. Mr. Skelton gave the bag to o~e 
of the assailants and was in the process of cli~bi~g ov~r 
the counter when he was struck by the shotgu~ wielded by o~e 
of the JT1en, later 1dentif1ed by '·1r. Skelto:1 at tr:al as t:e:--.co~ 
Lee Poole ('Tr. 83, 86, 121). 
~ive ffiinutes, and the store was well l_ctt~d ~· :nc ·J~c 
o~ the robbery (Tr. 27). 
-2-
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vehicle sped up and almost immediately made a right turn 
to go westbound on Downington Avenue (Tr. 24). Sergeant 
Brown followed the suspect automobile and saw it stopped 
at the north curb of the street. He observed two individual, 
running from the car northward up a driveway of a house 
on the street (Tr. 26). 
Sergeant Brown approached the car and saw a th1rd 
individual who had gotten out and who was walking away fro~ 
the car. Sergeant Brown ordered the ind1vidual to stop, 
detained him, and later had him arrested (Tr. 26-29). S e rc;ec:.: 
Brown identified defendant Poole at trial as the 1nd1v1dual 
arrested at that time (Tr. 27). 
Sergeant Brown observed a shotgun 1n plain s1ght 
on the rear floor of the vehicle v;h1ch matched the descr1pt1c: 
of the weapon used in the robbery that had been given by the 
police dispatcher (Tr. 28, 29). By that t1me, Officer~ ?les; 
and hdams had arrived at the scene, pursuant to commur.1cat:::. 
from Sergeant Brown. Officer Pless entered the car, searchE~ 
i~, and seized evidence (7r. 29). Sergeant Brown 2.nd Of:'~ce: 
Pless made a search of the area :or suspects while Of:'icer 
Adams placed defendant Poole u~der arrest. The sfarcr.i~c: 
officers were unable to loc2.te the suspects (Tr. 30). Ir, 
addition, other pol1ce off1cc:rs callc"d Jnto the arc·a v:<~l-,_ 
-4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unable to locate the suspects as there were only two or 
three officers searching on foot at any one time (Tr. 41) 
Officer Michael Pless testified that he seized 
several evidentiary items from the suspect vehicle, including 
a sho~gun, some currency and coins in a sock, cigarettes, 
and food ite~s. Pless testified that he recovered one 
hundred ~hirty-four dollars in currency and twenty-five 
dollars and t\-.'0 cents in coins (Tr. 49) . 
Seroeant Allen Clark was in the vicinity of Fifth 
East and Sixth South in the early Darning hours of July 6, 
1973, en9aged 1n his patrol activities and spec:fically 
look1n9 ~or ~~o 1nd1viduals suspected of the robbery of the 
~-ll s~ore. ~he suspects had been described by the initial 
pcl1ce 1nves~1gatcr on the scene and by later police radio 
52) . So~e tlDe after the robbery, the police 
5lspa~cher broadcas~ add1t1onal :n~ormation that the two 
~~sp~c~s ~he ~ere s~ill loose had been seen proceeding north 
~- ?curth Eas~ -·· ~he v1c1n1tv of E1ghth to Seventh South. 
--~ ~he ~:~e c: the broadcast, Sergeant Clark saw two black 
~a:e :~d:v1dua!s cross ~he in~ersect1on of Sixth South and 
Clark broadcast this information 
:.~ Ea~: a~~ S:xt~ Sc~th soc:hbound, went west on Sixth 
.·.:-.' ~·- :.·-- co·,...:l~ see ;1c:-t:- o~ Fourth East, and sav.' 
-~-
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nobody (Tr. 52-54). 
Officer Charles Cockayne was in the vicinity of 
Sixth South and Fourth East at approximately 5:00a.m. on 
July 6, 1978, looking for suspects of the robbery of the 
7-11 store. Cockayne testified that while at that location 
he saw in a field an object which he perceived to have the 
form of a man. It was still dark at that time, and the 
field was covered with dry weeds standing three to four 
feet high. Officer Cockayne stared at the object for a 
moment, saw that it moved, and alerted other police officers 
by radio that he had "possible suspects in the field." (Tr. 
57-58). Cockayne got out of his car, ran toward the field 
looking at the suspect and pointed out the location of the 
suspect to Officers Rackley and Adair, who had arrived at 
the scene. These other officers approached the field from 
another direction. and one of them stated that anot~er 
individual was fleeing through the field (~r. 59). ~he 
suspect seen by Cockayne was subsequently arrested, and the 
officers in the vicinity cordoned off the area and began a 
yard to yard search of the area (Tr. 60). i'.ftcr searching 
for approximately one half-hour to forty-~1ve ninutes, 
Officer Cockayne climbed over a s1x-foot h1gh fence beh1nd 
a house to check some bushes located in front of a tus:ness 
-E-
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building (Tr. 61, 62). Cockayne found appellant in a sitting 
position in the bush. Appellant's cap was about the same 
level as the bushes and he was wearing a black leather 
jacket, shoes, shirt, levis, and a denim cap. 
It was the testimony of Officer Russell Adair 
that he saw appellant run from the field which Adair had 
entered, jump a fence and disappear into a yard (Tr. 73, 74). 
of=lcer Adair testified further that appellant had on a 
dark jacket and some type of hat (Tr. 74). 
Robert Skelton, the vic~im of the robbery, testified 
that he had see~ appellant three times on the night of the 
rcCbery. First, appellant and another black man had come 
!~to the store to purchase several ltems. Second, Skelton 
sa~ apcellant near the phone booth in front of the store. 
:~~rd, Skelton saw appellant duri~g the course of the robbery 
,~:-. 9S, 99). Skelcon =ailed to identify appellant during 
:~e course of a lineup pr1or to appellant's preliminary 
hs ~ar as I can re~~nber, I was 
tcld a: :he :1~e o= the lineup to put 
do~n a cerso~'s number 1n a block and 
~ha: :~~: person played their role in 
cche ro:::ber·: ;s1c] 1f I ·.-:as ?OSitive 
~ha~ \{25 ~~e person. I~ n~· o~n mind 
I a~ not co1~c to coint a f1nger at 
so~~b~5~· ~~d ~a~· t~at 1s ~he person if 
I :r: r:-:: o· .. :n :--1:-:d at tha time v.·as not 
?Os:..t~:-e -:~2. -:~a:. 1s t e person, and 
~~a~ :~ ;;~~- said I d: ~ot recognize 
a:-.~:!=.oC:~- -:+- : ~ :.:nc. r. 127). 
-I-
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At trial Mr. Skelton testified that there was no 
chance that he could be mistaken about the identification 
of appellant as a participant in the robbery of the 7-11 
store (Tr. 121,122). Mr. Skelton further testified that he 
was positive about the identification of appellant as one 
of the perpetrators of the robbery (Tr. 127). 
Appellant testified in his own behalf at tr1al 
that he was in Salt Lake on the ni?ht of the robbery, and 
had been in Salt Lake fer two days previous. Appellant 
had less than twenty dollars with him when he arr1ved in 
Salt Lake (Tr. 141). He did not try to stay at the Salvat1on 
Army or other organ1zation that puts transients up, and he 
testified that he did not know such places were open all 
night even though he test1fied that he had hitchhiked thrcus~ 
most of the States of the Union (Tr. 141, 144, 145). 
According to appellant's testimony, he had gotten a r:de 
from a lon~-haired individual in ~ ,e early morning hours o~ 
July 6, 1978 to L1berty Park where appellant spent the 
night (Tr. 135, 136). T~ough appellant had been dr1nk1ng 
a lot of beer and had not had any sleep for two days, he 
testified that he could not sleep in the park (Tr. 144). 
Appellant further testif1ed that he left the park and star:c: 
to walk in the d1rect1on he thought would lcQd hirr to the 
Continental Trailways Bus Station where he had l··~t sc~ 
-8-
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lu(Jgage. Appellant testified that he saw police cars with 
t~clr spotlights and flashing lights on, leaned up against 
a house until the cars passed by, climbed over a fence in a 
backyard and hid in the bushes until he was found by 
office:::- Cockayne (Tr. 144-146). 
A~ trial, appellant's motions to dismiss the case 
against h1m, or in the alternative, for a directed verdict 
Jpon ~he Sta~e resting were denied by Judge Banks (Tr. 129-131) 
~ppellant's rnot1ons to dismiss and for a directed verdict 
~e:::-e rene~ed upon the defense resting and were again denied. 
::,·· Judg· San':s (Tr. 162, 169). 
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POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
DISMISSAL AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE 
CASE SINCE THERE \~AS SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT AND 
JUDGMENT OF GUILT. 
In proceedings before Judge Banks and out of the 
presence of the jury, appellant moved for dismissal of the 
case against him, or in the alternative, for a directed 
verdict, at the conclusion of the respondent's case-in-chief 
on the grounds that there was a reasonable doubt as to 
Robert Skelton's identification of appellant and that there 
was conflict between the testimony of Officer Cockayne and 
Officer Adair as to whether appellant was in the field 
where defendant thlliams was found (Tr. 131). Judge Banks 
denied both motions. Appellant again moved for d1smissal 
or in the alternative for a directed verdict upon defe~se 
resting, and the motions were again denied by Judge Banks 
on the grounds that since there was direct testimony that 
appellant was the man that robbed Skelton, the question of 
appellant's guilt was a question for the trier of fact, the 
jury, to determine (Tr. 168, 169). 
This Court, 1n State v. Penderville, 2 Ctah 2d 
281, 272 P.2d 195 (1954) upheld a convictlon c: s~c::cnd deere,' 
murder in spite cf a challenge to the tr1al court's fa1lure 
-10-
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to direct acquittal. The Court there wrote: 
It has been repeatedly held by 
this court that upon a motion to dismiss 
or to direct a verdict of not guilty for 
lack of evidence that the trial court 
does not consider the weight of the evi-
dence or credibility of the witnesses, 
but determines the naked legal proposition 
of law, whether there is any substantial 
evidence of the guilt of the accused, and 
all reasonable inferences are to be taken 
1n favor of the State . . [I] f there is 
before the Court evidence upon which 
reasonable men might differ as to whether 
the defendant is or is not guilty, he may 
deny the motion (emphasis added). 
272 P.2d 195, 198. 
See also State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d 95, 355 
P.2d 689 (1960); State v. \~oodall, 6 Utah 2d 8, 305 P.2d 
473 (1956) and State v. Garcia, 11 Utah 2d 67, 355 P.2d 
:07 (1960) 
In the instant case, there was direct testimony 
of the victi~ o~ ~he robbery, Rotert Skelton, that appellant 
·.·.·as one o~ the persons v:ho corrun1tted the robbery at the 7-11 
s::ore. ;..j:lpellant tes1:1fied that he did not rob Mr. Skelton. 
5:..::::'1 conflicti!1C -cest1:nony satis~1es the Penderville, supra, 
?r::~~s:on t'lat the court may deny the motion to dismiss if 
the Co:..:rt has before 11: ev1dence apon which reasonable men 
as tc whe1:her the defendant is or is not guilty. 
I:-, t~'1<= case of Sta-ce ,. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 
~s~c), thls Cot.:rt esta'=:l1shed the burden ,__·hich the prosecution 
-11-
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must bear to establish a prima facie case: 
In order to submit a question to 
the jury it is necessary that the _ros-
ecution establish a prima facie case. 
That is, it is necessary to present some 
evidence of every element needed to make 
out a cause of action, and it has long 
been established that such may be proven 
by direct and by circumstantial evidence. 
But the evidence required need only be 
that which is sufficient to conform to 
the statutory definition of the crlme 
charged, and the "element of each offense" 
is defined as (a) conduct, attendant 
circumstances, or results of conduct; and 
(b) the requisite mental state. 
At the trial of this case, the State introduced 
direct testimony that established that an Aggravated Rother~ 
was committed by an armed indi Vldual at the time a!ld place :~. 
question The State introduced further direct testimony tha: 
a second individual assisted in the robbery. This seco!ld 
individual lS clearly guilty of Aggravated Robbery under ~~e 
provisions of Ltah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 which orovides that: 
Every person . who directly 
commits the offense . or lnten-
tionally aids another person to engage 
in conduct which constitutes an o~fense 
shall be criminally liable as a party 
for such conduct 
The State produced dlrect evidence that estatlls~·~ 
appellant's identity as the second individual invclved 1n :~~ 
robbery. Robert SJ.:elton, the v1ctur. of :he roLter:: :·_ .s::L':·c~ 
as follows at trlal: 
-12-
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Q. 11r. Skelton, is there any chance 
that you're mistaken about the iden-
tification of 11r. Craig? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Are you certain that Mr. Craig was 
the individual that you observed with 11r. 
Poole at the time you were robbed? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is there any question in your mind 
that your identification is wrong? 
A. :Jo, sir. 
Q. You have no doubt whatsoever? 
(Tr. 121, 122) 
It is a \·Jell-settled axiom of criminal law in this 
Sta~e ~ha~ the jury is the sole JUdge of the credibility of 
·,.:l~''"sses. (Stac:e v. Sc:llivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 
\l'J5-); StatE \'. Estrada, 119 Utah 339, 227 P.2d 247 (1951) 
Sc:c.-::•c ·:. ::ocre, lll Ctah 458, 183 P.2d 973 (1947); State v. 
:.:::C~s, 530 P.2d ~272 (;,_·tah 1975); State v. Romero, supra; 
a :1 c S ~ =. ':: e v . ; ; : 1 so r. , 56 5 P . 2 d 6 6 ( Utah 19 77 ) ) • 
ThE ffiCrE ~arrow questio:-1 here involves the credibility 
o~ thE cri~e, Rober~ Skelton, who gave uncorrob-
~ra~0d ~estl~onv a-:: tr1al of the events of the robbery (Tr. 
7~e recent case o~ State v. Middelstadt, 579 P.2d 
-13-
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908 (Utah 1978), sets out the basis on which a reviewing 
court must deal with uncorroborated evidence. 
In general, the common law supports the 
contention that a conviction may be sus-
tained upon the uncorroborated testimony 
of the victim, and that such evidence is 
not insubstantial simply because the 
testimony is conflicting in some respects. 
As to the quality of the testimony given, 
it is settled that it must be so improbable 
that it is completely unbelievable before 
it is insufficient to uphold a conviction. 
We do not find that to be the case here 
(emphasis added;. 
579 P.2d at 911. 
Appellant does not claim that Skelton's testimony 
is so improbable that it is completely unbelievable. 
submits that Skelton's testimony is not "completely unbelievc: 
as witnessed by the jury's one hour deliberation and verdict 
of guilty after a two-day trial. 
In State v. Romero, supra, the Utah Court ruled, v:~-
regard to a revleWlng Court's weighing the evidencG, that: 
This Court has long upheld the standard 
that on an appeal from conv1ction the 
Court cannot weigh the evidence. 
Further, this Court has malntained that 
its function is not to determine guilt 
or innocence, the weight to give con-
flicting evidence, the credibllity of 
witnesses, or the weight to be given 
defendant's testlmony . 'We are 
concerned only with the question of the 
sufficiency of the evldence to sustal~ 
the convictions by showing that th~ Jury 
would have found beyond a reasonablt 
doubt that defendants were auilty. 
554 P.2d at 218. 
-14-
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This jury role was echoed in State v. Mills, supra, 
where this Court said: 
It is the prerogative of the jury to 
judge the weight of the evidence, the 
credibility of witnesses, and the facts 
to be found therefrom. 
530 P.2d at 1272. 
As to the specific evidentiary matter of uncorroborated 
testimony, State v. ~liddelstadt, supra, holds: 
. there is no rule governing how 
many ~itnesses are needed or that the 
test1mony need be corroborated by other 
evidence be~ore the trier of fact can 
decide how to determine the weight of 
the testimony. 
579 P. 2d at 911. 
The jGrors were not abligated to accept appellant's 
expla~ation of his involvement or non-involvement in the 
=rl~e. as ~as dec1ded in State v. Schoenfeld, 545 P.2d 193 
r r~-:a'--. 1916): 
In regard to defendant's contention 
that the evidence lS not sufficient to 
justify his conviction, these observations 
are pertlnent: The jury ~ere not obligated 
to ac=ept as true defendant's ~on version 
of the evidence nor his self-exculpating 
state~en-:s as to his intentions and his 
conduc-:. They were ent1tled to use their 
o-..;;-, j udCTient as to \,·hat ev1dence they would 
be:1e~e and ~o ~ra~ an~· reasonable inferences 
therefrom (emphasls added). 
- .... ~ ~.2C. at 1?5. 
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The Schoenfeld rule is most applicable in the 
present matter. After the State had presented its evidence, 
and appellant had testified as to his non-involvement in the 
robbery, the jury was given the matter resolution. At that 
point, the jurors may properly "use their own judgment" in 
arriving at the verdict. Their deliberations must be given 
great deference in order for them to determine "what evidence 
they would believe and to draw any reasonable inferences 
therefrom." Id. 
The standard a reviewing Court must apply 1n deter-
mining whether to reverse a conviction or an '' insuffic1ency 
of the evidence" claim is set out succinctly in State v. 
Romero, supra: 
This court has set the standard for 
detemining suff1ciency c:' evidence 
to require that it be so :~conclus1ve 
or so inherently improbable tha~ 
reasonable minds could not reasonably 
believe de:endant had comm1tted a crime. 
Unless there is a clear show1ng of lack 
of evidence, the jury verdict will be 
upheld. 
554 P.2d at 219. 
Respondent subm1ts that 1n view1ng the ev:dence -·· 
its entirety, as the jury did, lt 1s not "so inconclusl\·c- ·Jr 
so inherently improbable that r<easonable minds" could not 
co~vict appellant. On the contrary, respo~Oc-;'.t cOT"J:_c"nds l:~.~: 
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the evidence was sufficient and substantial and that, 
therefore, the jury verdict should be upheld. 
Finally, respondent would offer the relevant 
language of State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978) as a 
dispos1t1ve statement in resolving this appeal: 
The cautionary rule just referred 
to [the reasonable hypothesis rule] is 
but a specific application of the most 
basic principle in our criminal law: 
that an accused is presumed to be 
l~~ocent until his guilt is proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, 
1f there is any reasonable view of the 
credible evidence which is reconcilable 
Wlth ~he defendant's in~ocence, it would 
na~urally follow that there would be a 
reasonable dcubt as to his guilt. But 
we emphas1ze that this does not mean 
JUS~ any view of any of the evidence, 
however unsubstant1al or incredible, 
wh1ch a cartv to such a controversy may 
C.rea.~, up. 
* * * 
c·::de:-.c-=:. ~h1s 1s ~ecessarily true because 
:.n cerformino ~heir dutv as finders of the 
fac~ :h=v ar~ the exclu~ive judges of the 
cred:t:li~v of ~he evidence. In so doing, 
the·: .. a·· c~ns1der all o.:: ~he facts affirm-
at'~ely- ~hown, as well as any unexplained 
a=~~s, a~d ~=a~ ~ha:ever 1n~erences may 
fa:rlv and reascnablv be drawn therefrom 
:.n th~ !:cht o= thei~ cwn exper1ence and 
_.·c:c"·'e:-.~. ::::-, co:>sider:.:>g ,,·hat happened 
:.n th:s case 1:1 accordance with the reasoning 
d:.sc~ssec above, the JUrors could fairly and 
r~~8c~at:~· cc~clude t~a~ i~ \~as the defendant 
·,.::-.c ~2-:~·..~ 1-:~~C :_~'1e cr:.. ... ~. J 
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Respondent suggests that the same reasoning is 
applicable to the present case and resolves the appeal in 
favor of the respondent. 
POINT II 
ON APPEAL, EVIDENCE SHOULD BE VIEWED 
IN THE LIGHT HOST FAVORABLE TO THE 
VERDICT OF CO!'<VICTION. 
At trial, the flnder of fact, in this case the 
jury, found appellant guilty of Aggravated Robbery. On 
appeal, the evidence should be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of conviction. State v. 1\ard, 
10 Utah 2d 34, 341 P.2d 865 (1959); State v. Berchtold, 
11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 (1960). The finder of fact, 
here the jury, was in the best pos1t1on to observe the 
facial expressions, mannerisms and tone of voice of wltnesse! 
and thus was in the best position to weigh the ev1dence. 
Those kinds of judgme:1ts are diff1cult, 1f not impossible, 
to make on appeal. By examining the evidence, however, 1: 
is obvious that the jury's verdict is heavily supported t· 
the evidence. The verdict w1ll not be overturned en appeal 
unless it appears that the ev1dence was so inconclusive 
or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds must have Lntertai~ 
reasonable doubts that the cr1me v:as cor.c-,1 tte:O. 
Sullivan, supra; State: v. DanY:s, l~ L'tat 2d 1(:, 3:::,0 F.=:d 
146 (1960). 
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Further, the Utah Court has determined that on 
appeal from conviction, the Supreme Court must assume that 
the jury believed those aspects of evidence and drew inferences 
that reasonably co~ld be drawn therefrom in the light favorable 
to the verdict. State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977) 
S-:ate v. Gandee, 587 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1978). And where the 
defendant's version of ~hat occurred is sharply different in 
vltal aspects from the State's evidence, the Supreme Court 
is obllged to assurr.e on appeal from a conviction that the 
JUr~ believed that ~hich supports their verdict, State v. 
Peoci:hs:--,, 550 P.2d 728 (Utah 1976). In other words, the 
s-::c:c:1g presu.-,p-:~o:-. lS the trial •:erdict is correct. Appellant, 
-:or prevall, has t~e t~rden to prove that the verdict was 
u~~~~s2~alte, a~d ~~~s ~e has fa1led to do. 
~~e :es::~o:-; o~ appellant is highly improbable 
a~~ a~=~~~s ~c ~o~~:~~ ~o~e t~a~ seli-serving protestations 
Th:s Court has pointed out that: 
A ~~:-der of fact is not necessarily 
bounci :c acce~t as concluslve a testimony 
o~ a 1-:~-:r.ess.· E:s crec:bility may be 
~~=~ache~ tc· sE:f-interest or improbability 
so. :hat :: ~oulc be entlrely wlthin the 
r·~a:r c~ ~e2so~ ~o 6:sc2u~t or to entirely 
G2-sc:-·:::C.::. 1:.. 
589, 253 P.2d 355, 356 ( 19 53) . 
rv.dcnce a:1d the reasonable inferences 
l:ch: ~est favorable to the jury's 
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verdict, it cannot be said that a reasonable jury would 
necessarily entertain some substantial doubt of appellant's 
guilt. The jury's verdict was amply supported by the 
evidence and on appeal, the evidence should be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of conviction. 
CONCLUSIO>.J 
Claims on appeal of insufficiency of the evidence 
must be reviewed in light of the total evidentiary picture. 
The uncorroborated testimony of Robert Skelton is not per 
se a dificient form of evidence and can only be determined 
insufficient where the Court finds the testimony to be 
completely unbelievable. The jury's verdict which relied on 
Skelton's testimony is therefore a proper one since a careful 
review of the trial transcript shows that the testimony was 
sufficiently believable. 
On the basis of the above authority and the eviden~ 
against appellant shov:n at trial, respondent prays that the 
verdict and sentence be affirmed. 
Respectfully submit~ed, 
ROBERT B. HJ..l:SEN 
Attorney General 
Er..RL F. DORILlS 
.L.ssistant j".,t torney G(":1eral 
Attcrne~·s fo~ Rcspo~dc~t 
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